Hypothesis use in the context of other forms of reasoning and
logic in ecology
While I agree with Betts et al.’s points about how hypotheses are
excellent for being explicit, thinking through multiple possibilities,
and avoiding your own biases, I cannot agree with what I take to be
their argument that the hypothetico-deductive process is the culmination
of science practice. In general, epistemology, like the ecological world
itself that is our subject, is heterogenous, varying, and complex (see
Liebenberg 2013). As I indicated above, our disciplinary line-drawing
around living things does not mean that they are a uniform collection of
phenomena that all behave in pre-identified ways. The identification of
problems, and the reasoning approaches needed to answer questions about
those problems, works well when it mirrors the heterogenous, varying,
and interacting structure of living systems, through the use of a mix of
multiple forms of reasoning, argumentation and logic.
Hypothetico-deductive methods are of course a hallmark of science, and
are powerful if used intelligently (following many of the suggestions in
Betts et al.), and if not over-applied to every question. The real
question is not whether to use hypotheses, but how to recognise and
develop a question that can be best answered with a
hypothetico-deductive process. This is not an easy question to answer,
and although many experienced ecologists and other scientists develop a
sense of how to track down and corner a good hypothesis, this is
something we should discuss more in order to develop disciplinary
aesthetics or styles around hypothesis formation (Root-Bernstein 2002;
Eastwood et al. 2013).
The equally important corrolary to this is how to recognise a question
that can best be answered with other forms of reasoning, logic, and
argument. This is especially true if we consider the need to engage in
interdisciplinary research to more fully understand socioecological
systems (Root-Bernstein 2016), or the desireability of engaging with
indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) in conservation and ecology
projects (Wheeler & Root-Bernstein 2020). Having a range of forms of
reasoning, logic, and argumentation proper to ecology that go beyond
statistical answers to questions posed as hypotheses will provide
multiple avenues for communication and collaboration. There is also, in
my view, a benefit to the explicit recognition that ecological science
has (or should have) its own set of arguments, logic and reasoning, and
that it has (or should have) styles and aesthetics of different
qualities of reasoning. It is relatively more difficult to collaborate
with ILK holders if your only account for why you use the
hypothetico-deductive method is that it directly reveals the true
structure of the universe. When we can discuss our aesthetics and logics
around good hypothesis use, we open the door to being relativistic in a
constructive/ productive way.