Defining Fake Kindness
The extent and prevalence of an innate human affinity for kindness has
been a religious and philosophical preoccupation for a very long time
[1]. But despite its importance in day-to-day language and
sense-making, the concept of kindness has remained somewhat peripheral
in academic debates [4, 5]. At the social and ethnological level,
the focus has instead generally been on somewhat related concepts such
as reciprocity and altruism. At the individual level, some validated
scales and instruments exist [5, 6] but again, the concept hasn’t
been attracting a huge level of attention. Without any ambition to
summarize existing knowledge on the concept, for the purpose of our
argument we propose that kindness can be split into two components. One
is behavioural and the other teleological as it deals with finalities
and intents.
We define behavioural kindness as including all that one can observe
from the outside: Ways of looking at others and listening to them, the
tone and voice used, the language, the overall body posture. From an
ethological point of view, behavioural kindness could be defined as the
sum of all human readable signs of non-aggression. In addition to this
first level, there certainly are also cultural and social components
that go beyond the ethological and relate to social structuring [2].
Outside signs of non-aggression will vary throughout time, places, and
culture. However, the main point we want to make regarding this first
component of kindness is that it does not go beyond appearances. In
itself it doesn’t achieve whatever outcomes kindness can accomplish.
Teleological kindness, on the other hand, includes all the values and
intentions that support and guide kind actions. It concerns itself with
the why and what of kindness. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is often quoted for
this definition of kindness mainly framed around selflessness:
“Kindness – under the influence of which a man is said to ’be
kind’ – may be defined as helpfulness towards someone in need, not in
return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but
for that of the person helped. ” [7] In the same text, Aristotle
then proceeds to specify that selflessness is central to the notion of
kindness as helping others in the context of a reciprocal exchange or
with selfish motivations does not qualify. Similar ideas can be found in
many philosophical and religious perspectives. For example, Maimonides
emphasizes that giving to those in need without knowing to whom one
gives and when the recipient doesn’t know who gave belongs to the higher
levels of kindness. In the same way, the centrality of selflessness and
of a generic trust in humankind remains central in contemporary
definitions. “Real kindness is an exchange with essentially
unpredictable consequences. It is a risk precisely because it mingles
our needs and desires with the needs and desires of others, in a way
that so-called self-interest never can. ”[1]. In our view, how
selfless one needs to be in order to be kind is an open question. One
could argue that the neutral point might be non-maleficence and that
anything on the helpful side of it qualifies as kindness. This question
is especially important when it comes to professional expectations. We
believe that once kindness is defined as selflessness, it probably can’t
be part of one’s job description. But, for many professionals,
non-malevolence (for example expressed as primum non nocere ) is a
central expectation.
The main point we want to make, however, is about the distinction
between the behavioural and teleological components of kindness. For
reasons we will explore, some people adopt the behavioural components of
kindness without having any teleological interest in being kind. As we
will argue in more detail below, in such cases, behavioural kindness
should be understood as a social tool aimed at modifying the behaviour
of others. Interestingly, when Paley [8] discusses compassion in the
context of nursing, he makes a distinction between two components of the
concept. He suggests that compassion is both a behaviour – defined here
as actual actions that are compassionate – and a motivation – the
intent to be compassionate – and that one component does not imply the
other. Paley’s components of compassion are quite different from ours
when defining kindness, but they connect to the same principle that
behaviours and intents should not be presumed to be easily inferred one
from the other. In the same way, the dissociation of behavioural
and teleological components of kindness is what we describe here as
“fake kindness” .
The level of dissociation is also meaningful in itself. Some displays of
fake kindness will push the behavioural signs to lengths that are almost
caricatural. The voice will be oddly unctuous, the tone will be kept to
extreme non-assertiveness, the smile will be rigidly kept on. Overdone
behavioural signs of kindness are, in our experience, correlated with
the extent to which the content or implications of the statements are
actually harmful to others.
In popular culture, one well-known example of a caricatural dissociation
between the behavioural and teleological components of kindness would be
the fictional character of Dolores Umbridge from the Harry Potter
novels. Under Umbridge’s lavish girlishness, unctuous manners and
smiles, lies a mildly sadistic person and one of the book’s
most-despised villains. Another fictional character that embodies the
concept of fake kindness with blood-curling realism would be Nurse
Ratched from One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Ratched is a stern but
soft-spoken character always acting like she is concerned by the
wellbeing of the patients under her care and acting in their best
interests. However, as the movie unfolds, it becomes obvious that this
pretence and her motherly concerns are artifices to impose her ruthless
and tyrannical rule on everyone. In recent public events, many
commenters have also used the term fake kindness to describe the
approach of Dr. Bonnie Henry, the provincial health officer of British
Columbia during the Covid-19 pandemic. Dr. Henry’s trademark “be kind”
motto, smiles and soft voice were instrumental to her successes in her
role notwithstanding the fact many, like the provincial Human Rights
Commissioner, expressed deep concerns about the ultimate impact of her
decisions.
It might also be worth emphasizing that fake kindness isn’t really an
effort at deception. In most situations, the agents involved will
rapidly decode that there is a silent whip cracking behind the unctuous
voice. In that sense, fake kindness is different from hypocrisy – or
what Beard [9] describes as performative kindness – as everyone
involved is likely aware that no sincere efforts at selflessness exist.